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The Commander-in-Chief has issued the edict that "we must continue
to make whatever changes are necessary in our Defense Establishment to
increase its efficiency and to insure that it keeps pace with the demands of an
ever -changing world ..." Our ever-changing world and the environment of
international tensions which create an atmosphere of more frequent and more
highly ordered limited wars directly involving the United States make it man-
datory that we be competent and able to cope with all military contingencies.
The only rational approach is that of developing a capability of defense funding
which is flexible to the point of providing for total as well as limited war.
Such a system is within America's spiritual and material resources, but it
demands an effective as well as efficient means of planning and budgeting for
defense needs. This is the thesis of this paper concerning the adequacy of our
nation's capabilities in meeting contingency requirements under the Five -Year
Force Structure and Financial Program.
Methodology
The historical and objective material for this study was collected
through library and records research. Much of the useful current information
U. S. , President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message on the
Defense Budget, " State of Our Defenses Message to the 89th Congress,




to be found in the Department of Defense (DOD) regarding this subject is of a
classified nature. To circumvent this restriction, certain information is pre-
sented through personal interview methods. Observations and interviews with
both military officers and civilian officials of the DOD have served to bring out
significant areas of weakness or unworkability. In this regard, no single state-
ment nor any individual's remark should be construed as reflecting any position
other than his own. Yet these individuals are the formulators, the submitters,
and the users who are actively engaged in proposing changes, supporting
"reclama" position papers, and reprogramming. Acting in these capacities,
they are responsible executors of the trusts reposed in them.
Justification
Initial development of this study deals with the present programming
system which is designed for efficiency and economy in a long-run, semi-
routine, peacetime environment as a means of "bridging the gap" between
planning and budgeting. We are now faced with responding to a limited war
situation under the standing program budget guidelines, the limitations of
human abilities, existing statutes, and a political policy which seemingly invali-
dates our present system. An important problem which must be faced imme-
diately is how we are to continue to program and budget for the necessary
defense posture against strategic war, military aid for civil uprisings, and
the support of NATO force commitments while maintaining the flexibility to
meet limited war requirements.
iii

The effort of this paper is to investigate one aspect of the Five -Year
Force Structure and Financial Program. Through a detailed examination of
its structure and operation, questions will be asked and answered as to the
value of the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program in times of
increased military mobility and fluctuating force requirements.
This paper is suggested for use as a primer for officers reporting for
duty in the programming and budgeting field. The factual revelation concern-
ing the intent of the Programming System in addition to the realistic appraisal
of service budgetary problems should provide replacement personnel with the
overall perspective essential to constructive effort.
While the program budget has now been reduced to a systematic, if
not routine, operation, it has never been required to operate under such pro-
longed emergency requirements as those encountered in calendar year 1965.
Three questions will aid in bringing to light the problems which now seem to
encumber the effectiveness of the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial
Program. These questions serve to uncover weaknesses in the routine
actions of the planning, programming, and budgeting process. The questions
are:
1. Does the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program con-
tain sufficient flexibility and/or adequate resources to deal with rapidly
changing military force requirements ?
2. Can the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program be
modified to better accommodate limited war requirements ?
iv

3. Have the controls built into the Programming System resulted in a
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When Robert S. McNamara was sworn into office as the eighth Secretary
of Defense on January 22, 1961, he was instructed by President John F.
Kennedy to develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements
without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings and to procure and operate this
force at the lowest possible cost.
To accomplish the second of these charges, McNamara brought to bear
many scientific approaches to decision making. Among these was an approach
advocated by the then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Charles J.
Hitch, relating military programs to the sequence of annual budgets in an
attempt to facilitate meaningful long-range planning. Such a budget was sub-
mitted to the Congress for the first time in January, 1962. It utilized pro-
gram terms to interface military planning with the budget functions.
Since implementation, this method of budgeting for military require-
ments has allowed defense managers to determine more methodically the
courses of action and time-phased military force requirements necessary to
accomplish their overall missions. This new planning -programming -budgeting
concept provides greater economy since the budgetary systems required may
be developed while taking advantage of the cost-utility analyses which provide
maximization of a specified cost, or the attainment of a required objective at
a minimum cost.

With the approach taken by McNamara and Hitch came the Five -Year
Force Structure and Financial Program (FYFS&FP). The FYFS&FP func-
tions to record and explain all major details of service forces and weapon
systems for the next five years. This summation of all Department of
Defense approved programs and program elements serves as a central ref-
erence. In addition, it enables effective decision making by itemizing the
total cost of embarking on any project. Utilization of the FYFS&FP made it
possible, for the first time, to see the proposed defense force costs as com-
pared with the overall mission. Each major urogram is divided into elements
so that the total operating costs are estimable by a knowledge of the mission,
the equipment, and the personnel needs involved.
Planning /programming of this nature is now essential. The present
range of choices has become too broad and the quantity of alternatives too
numerous for any lesser control. The Five -Year Force Structure and Finan-
cial Program has proven to be such a successful tool in defense decision
making that President Lyndon B. Johnson has directed the introduction of an
integrated planning -programming -budgeting system within nearly all depart-
ments and agencies of the Executive Branch.
Chapter I introduces the economic theory governing responsible
defense actions and the environment within which the present and continued
funding requirements must be met. These requirements evolve as a direct
result of national defense policy. Chapter II introduces the Department of
Defense Programming System and the intended purpose of the FYFS&FP.

Presented in Chapter III are the programming and budgeting procedures cur-
rently applied within the Department of Defense and the effects these proce-
dures have upon the individual military services. Chapter IV presents the
conclusions drawn from this study and recommended areas of further study.
To assist the reader uninitiated in the technical jargon of the comptroller, a
glossary of frequently used terms with their general usage in this paper has
been placed in the Appendix.

CHAPTER I
THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE IN THE
AGE OF LIMITED WAR
Ever since our unilateral disarmament at the close of World War II
failed to produce a lasting peace, the United States has been forced to main-
tain a diversified military capability and to engage in military efforts un-
precedented in alleged times of peace. The intricacies of modern technology
seem to have made present-day warfare more science than art, the only
factor remaining constant being the knowledge that these implements of
defense must ultimately be paid for by the citizenry.
The past decade has seen the pendulum swing from the cutback of
military spending to the proliferation of weapons during a heavy spending
arms race against communism. Momentum again returned, and by 1958 it
had become increasingly evident that tactical atomic weapons would cancel
themselves out. The proponents of balanced forces realized that modern
technology made it impossible to secure a long-range advantage through
stockpiled weaponry. Throughout 1959 and I960 an increasing number of
debates regarding strategies took place. In 1961, at the advent of the
McNamara regime, the Administration returned to a closer scrutiny of
defense spending.

With the establishment of strong and aggressive civilian leadership in
control of the military, considerations other than those foremost in the minds
of military planners were brought to bear. Perhaps it was inevitable that, as
our nuclear arms capability grew to create a strategic stalemate, we should
see more clearly the implications that could ensue. National leaders have
come to realize that not only are total resources at the disposal of the nation
limited, they are exceedingly difficult to use effectively.
The Allocation of Resources
The law of supply and demand serves as the natural determinant of
utility in the private sector, with profit used as a measurement of overall
performance and efficiency. Money functions as the common denominator of
the private markets. Resources may therefore be readily reduced to quanti-
tative terms.
The mechanics of resource utilization are not nearly this clear-cut in
the public sector. When the government purchases goods and services, it
allocates resources between these two sectors according to the preferences
of its citizens. In actuality, this process reduces private purchasing power.
As a result, a portion of the total resources available is channeled into public
consumption through appropriations enacted in The Budget of the United States ,
Because profit is not used as an indicator within the public sector, other
means must be found to indicate the adequacy of the outputs.
David J. Ott and Attiat F. Ott, Federal Budget Policy (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 80.

The fact that governmental activities are organized in accordance
with the budget principle means that the objective test of efficiency
which is ever-present in the market economy is lacking here. There
are no tangible and self -enforcing criteria for judging efficiency in the
public sector; in fact, there is a great deal of fuzziness in the use of
terms in connection with governmental activities. 1
Despite our affluence, we are a nation of unfilled needs, and both the
public and private sectors of our economy can benefit from the application of
additional resources to areas such as education, health, and transportation.
It was consequently determined that the resources ultimately to be used for
defense endeavors must not merely be satisfactorily allocated, but they must
be applied to the optimum alternative available. This optimization may take
one of two forms:
1. If our need is for a given level of utility or military effective-
ness, the alternative (or combination of alternatives) must be found
which accomplishes the task at minimum cost.
2. When the limit of the budget is constrained, it becomes neces-
sary to find the alternative (or combination of alternatives) which
maximizes effectiveness.
In judging which alternative adds the largest increment of utility, a
tangible reference is provided by which to measure the efficiency of resource
and force utilization. This method for allocating scarce resources among
Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.
, 1959), p. 35.
2
G. H. Fisher, Analytical Support for Defense Planning, Paper P-
2650 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, October, 1962), p. 3.

alternative uses has come to be called ''systems analysis. " The same
economic theory was used during World War II under the term "operations
research" with the exception that systems analysis conceptually involves more
complex problems, problems which reach five to ten years into the future and
problems specifically concerned with development and procurement. Systems
analysis is much like cost effectiveness except that the systems analyst usually
deals in problems of what ought to be done, not how it shall be done. Greater
emphasis is therefore placed on the suitability of the task and the choice of
1
alternatives.
It is easy to see at this point how the economics of defense took a dom-
inant position as the McNamara regime demanded more reliance on the scien-
tific approaches to management of the public sector. Forced to conform to
the budget as a control device of government, defense managers began to
make this same budget serve them as an efficient instrument of decision
making. By restating the explicit cost of all projects in quantified terms, it
became possible to program for future objectives with an accurate projection
of their total cost and an estimation of whether they could be done within the
limits of the existing appropriation categories and whether the most efficient
manner had been chosen to accomplish the required results.
Historically speaking, this period of regrouping and consolidation was
a fundamentally stable era. The United States was engaged in more than a
Chauncey F. Bell, Cost -Effectiveness Analysis as a Management
Tool
,
Paper P-2988 (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, October, 1964),
p. 2.

normal share of crises, such as Berlin, Formosa, Suez, and Cuba; but
these were relatively short lived and did not seriously upset the overall plan
of our expanding economy. Upon occasion there was heard the usual cry of
waste and inefficiency; by and large, however, our defense machine had never
known such economies. The planning for our military requirements was
carried out with the sure and effective progress of informed decision making.
Warfare and Deterrents --Considerations for Defense Policy
The problems of national security, or defense policy, are becoming
increasingly complex. The new concepts of war and strategy, the long lead
times, the high cost of support and weapon systems, the rapid technological
advances, the interaction of military missions, and the magnitude of the
potential enemy threat have all contributed to making national security deci-
2
sions more difficult than ever before. Complexity adds to the burden of
study and analysis required for informed decision making, just as the penal-
ties of war itself make attention to the problem necessary as never before.
Today our national security has come to be shaped by the possible
challenges which confront us. Looking specifically at enemy threats, one
sees three standing out most starkly. These are: all-out war, limited war,
and a type of war new to the twentieth century but highly developed by the
Refer to Wesley W. Posvar et al . , American Defense Policy
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. ixff.
2
G. H. Fisher, The New OASD (Comptroller) Programming /Budgeting
Process , Research Memorandum RM-3048-PR (Santa Monica: The RAND
Corporation, March, 1962), p. 1.

communists --the obscure war concealed as internal subversion or takeover
by coup d'etat. A brief study of these factors constituting our general envi-
ronment will serve to set the stage for the analysis of the problems within
this setting.
All-out War
Unlimited war poses the greatest threat to national security. This car
be envisioned as the ultimate war where no constraints would be applied to
weaponry or targets. This war, therefore, must be prevented; yet the basic
requirements for a retaliatory force alone can easily overcome any defense
budget capability. The preparedness for all-out war depends upon a suitable
mix of: (1) a retaliatory force so powerful that the attacker must content with
a retaliation of estimable damage; (2) an active defense which will assure the
survival of some portion of the retaliatory force as well as reduce the effect
of damage on population and the economy; and (3) a passive defense that afford
2
some protection to population and the economy. Though all-out strategic
war is the cause of our greatest defense requirement, we, as a rational peo-
ple, would wish to believe that it no longer represents the foremost threat.
Equivalent nuclear strategic striking forces have made the alternatives of
economical mass destruction seem marginal.
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.
,
International Security- -The Mili-









Known by many names, the small war, the brush fire war, and insur-
gency, this action has recently ranged from Cuba to Cambodia. Osgood stated
that "two basic, historically unique conditions encourage limited war: a deep
conflict of aims and interests between nations that hold a predominance of
world power, and a terrifying capability of the two antagonists to destroy each
other. "
Mobilization for a limited war cannot be conducted within the same
guidelines as for a general war. Limited war does not consist of a single,
all -demanding economic effort to preserve human rights; rather, it is pri-
marily political and waged with specific restraints. It may be limited in
terms of geography and not of weapons or targets within the combat area.
This results in a high-order conflict with the possibility of small nuclear
weapons being employed. Or it can be stringently limited, with respect to
weapons and targets, and follow the pattern of a low -order confrontation.
Limitation may apply in some respects and not in others, or even to one of
the belligerents with the exclusion of the other. Limited war is fought depend-
ing upon the scope of the objectives of the warring powers and upon the forces
2
used to achieve their own objectives while depriving the enemy of his. The
key lies in the objective limits, but includes political, ideological, economic,
Robert E. Osgood, Limited War, The Challenge to American





and logistical components, in addition to the military and technical ones.
Limited war in the Dictionary of United States Army Terms is defined
as "armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the
2
overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations. " In order
to begin to combat war actively under such conditions, it becomes necessary
to have: (1) a defense force capable of limited conventional or limited nuclear
war at any time or place and under any conditions; (2) adequate military man-
power to meet any demands; and (3) the logistical capabilities necessary to
move either with great speed or with great quantities over a variable range
of distances.
Counter insurgency
The third threat against national security is that of internal subversion
or counterinsurgency (COIN). This is more than just a military problem
inasmuch as it includes political, economic, civil, and psychological compo-
nents which become difficult to combat on a national level. This fact is
brought clearly into focus by the present Viet Nam conflict, which, from its
inception, has been as much political as military, as much economic as
3
military, and as much psycho -social as military.
M. G. Weiner, The Role of Operations Research in Planning for
Limited War , Paper P-2654 (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation,
October, 1962), p. 4.
2
Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Washington: Headquarters,
Department of the Army, AR-320-5, February, 1963), p. 216.
3




One of the greatest threats to the security of the Free World is
gradual Soviet infiltration and domination of vital areas through steps
each of which is so small and seemingly so insignificant that it does
not seem to justify overt intervention. *
The gradual subversion of a government by concealed foreign penetration is
difficult to deal with. Carefully disguised wars may appear as an internal
revolution or civil war, while in reality they may be instigated and exploited
by outside forces. As a result, a clear understanding of our national purpose
must be maintained. Military and economic aid should be provided to the
more vulnerable allied countries where these forces are, or could be, at
work.
Limited Resources and Alternative Choices
It rapidly becomes evident that not even a diversified military
establishment can afford protection from the total range of inherent dangers.
It becomes economically infeasible to provide funding for the requirements
necessary to maintain merely adequate national defense policy in this uncer-
tain era. Much effort was given to the development of this philosophy by
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean in their work, The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age . Since this subject has also become the thesis
2
of subsequent works by Hitch and other members of the RAND Corporation,
it is sufficient to conclude that:
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. , op. cit. , p. 24.
2A brief history of the RAND Corporation is presented in the Editor's
Special Report: "Planners for the Pentagon, " Business Week
,
July 13, 1963.
A more complete analysis is made by Saul Friedman, "The RAND Corpora-




No country can defend itself fully against all possible external
threats. It takes certain risks with respect to defense for the sake of
increasing the domestic welfare of its citizens. It must also compro-
mise between the present and the future. The more actively it pro-
motes defense and welfare at the present time, the more it may (under
certain conditions) retard the long-run economic development of the
country, by curtailing both private and public investment in the future. *
It would seem entirely logical to assume that our forces for all-out
war should prove useful in limited war; but it is dangerous to rely too heavily
on strategic strike forces to fight a limited war. Deterrent forces must be
kept in a state of highest readiness during periods of limited conflict to main-
tain this overall retaliatory sanction. An aggressor who can inflict substan-
tial attrition on our strategic striking forces in limited war will gain an advan-
tage regardless of the limited engagement's outcome. Realizing that this is
an added penalty of limited war, we must be particularly aware of the warning
which the history of war indicates with frightful clarity.
In judging the present prospect of limited war the most obvious
relevant fact is that, in spite of the vast potentialities of unlimited
war, the period since World War II has actually been a period of
limited war.
Defense Considerations for Limited War
Considering the preceding statement and the present international
situation, there is cause for a more discerning look into the relevance of
The RAND Corporation, Program Budgeting . . . , ed. David N.
Novick (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 2.
2
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. , op. cit .
, p. 23.
3




limited war. Although the difference between limited war and total war is
partly a matter of degree, the distinction is clear enough in practice to have
significance for national policy. "The distinctive feature of limited war is that
its outcome does not involve or seem to involve national survival. " This is
why it is hard to deal with. Does any particular move raise doubts whether
2
this particular encroachment warrants a final showdown ? Limited war does
not demand that all human and material resources, save for subsistence, be
mobilized against the enemy. It remains a question of morality and expedi-
ency, with a feasible strategy based upon a conception of limitations acceptable
to national strategy. It is geographically confined and permits economic,
social, and political patterns of existence to continue without serious disrup-
tion. It does not even demand the utmost in military effort of which the forces
involved are capable.
Because these components constitute the essence of limited war, it is
easily misunderstood by those who are not either actively engaged in the fight
for life or are responsible for the national defense policy. This excerpt from
Limited War --The Challenge to American Strategy clarifies the issue:
The rational use of military power requires a strategy capable of
achieving two primary objectives: (a) the deterrence of such major
aggression as would cause total war; (b) the deterrence or defeat of
lesser aggressions, which could not appropriately be met except by
means short of total war. To deter total war, the United States must
convince potential aggressors of two things: first, that it can subject





them to destruction so massive that they could not possibly gain any
worthwhile objective from a total war; second, that it will employ this
kind of retaliation against aggression so threatening as to be equiva-
lent to an attack upon the United States itself. To deter or defeat
lesser aggressions the United States must convince potential aggres-
sors --and demonstrate if necessary- -that it is willing and able to con-
duct effective limited warfare. Unless the nation can also wage lim-
ited war successfully, communist aggression may force the United
States to choose between total war, non-resistance, or ineffective
resistance. *
Structured in less subtle and more succinct terms, this means that force is
useless, without a resolution to use it.
But even with a resolution to use our force, America is powerless to
do so without the necessary funds and a flexible budgetary system. National
security programs depend upon the financial resources and the manner in
which they are applied. Because of the significance of national security, all
eyes turn to the Pentagon to view the methods of the budgetary process within






PLANNING - PROGRAMMING - BUDGETING
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The Program Budget Arrives
Budgeting on a Functional Basis
Prior to management by program, the Department of Defenae exer-
cised financial management through use of the functional budget as considered
by Congress. The Congressional format consisted of the time-honored appro-
priation categories of military personnel, operation and maintenance, pro-
curement, research and development, and military construction. These
same classifications have been used in the annual defense budget which tradi-
tionally serves as the means for the allocation of resources through the DOD
to the services in support of military activities.
This budgetary formulation left much to be desired from the standpoint
that functional categories did not "focus on the key decision-making areas
which were of principal concern to top management in the Defense Depart-
ment. " Hence, a lack of objectivity in long-range planning resulted. Con-
tinuity could not be assured when the Congress was apt to have more enthu-
siasm for recent innovations than for support of planned courses of action,
Charles J. Hitch, "Management of the Defense Dollar, " The Federal




or when the rotation of principal military budget personnel gave rise to con-
tinually shifting impetus.
As modern weapons became more complex and costly, requiring
longer periods to develop, weapon systems became the key decision areas in
the overall defense program. Effective decision making required relevant
2
and precise data. By relating accurately costed weapon systems, and the
forces needed to employ them, to their mission effectiveness, a proper com-
parison of alternatives based upon estimated future performance became
feasible. Information of this preciseness could not be provided by the then
existing financial system.
It was evident that the financial system needed to be reconstructed if
3
it wag to provide the quantitative data needed to support critical decisions.
These are the decisions of force levels and weapon systems selection that
also involve the composition of all military units. Yet, this restructuring
could not be fundamentally too different.
. .
. The financial management system of the Defense Department must
serve many purposes. It must produce a budget in a form acceptable to
the Congress. It must account for the funds in the same manner in which
they were appropriated. It must provide the managers at all levels in
Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
The Navy Programming Manual; Part I, Programming Overview , OPNAV
90P-1 (September, 1964), p. 2-1.
2
Charles T. Horngren, Accounting for Management Control: An
Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 324.
3
Hitch, The Federal Accountant, XI, 35.
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the defense establishment the financial information they need to do their
particular jobs in an effective and economical manner. It must produce
the financial information required by the other agencies of the govern-
ment- -the Bureau of the Budget, the Treasury, and the General Account-
ing Office. 1
A Program Basis for Control
The term "program" has been used in many ways which differ from
the connotation it was given by the Department of Defense in 1954. Here it
provides a means of combining the related defense activities (such as man-
power, equipment, installations, and supplies) for a military mission. Pro-
gram budgeting is the integrated planning -programming -budgeting process
which brings together all the resources applied to specific missions. The
program budget procedure serves two primary functions: (1) It permits
analysis of total force structure for all military services in terms of com-
mon missions (national objectives); and (2) it projects the resources, or
financial requirements, of these force structures over an extended period of
2
years.
Through the use of the Programming System, it is now possible to
place the Navy's POLARIS weapon system in juxtaposition with other similar
elements of the Strategic Retaliatory Forces, such as the ATLAS, TITAN, or
MINUTEMAN. It is no longer necessary to have the POLARIS competing for
Charles J. Hitch, Decision Making for Defense (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 28.
2
David Novick, Program Budgeting in the Department of Defense,




funds under the appropriation title of Military Construction, Navy, at the
expense of additional aircraft carriers. Planning can be done in terms of the
missions, forces, and systems which are the products of defense expenditures.
By cutting across the traditional service boundaries with major programs and
the elements which constitute them, the program budget approach has provided
much firmer footing for the ultimate decision maker.
Programs may be formally reviewed more frequently and with far
greater ease than was previously possible during the annual budget review.
. . . The programming system should make the annual budget review
more orderly and thorough. Since the basic program review will have
been accomplished prior to budget review, only minor program adjust-
ments should be needed during the budget season. This should permit
the accomplishment of a better budget review, in that more time will be
available for analysis . . . and numerous other considerations involved
in preparation of the annual budget. ^
The Department of Defense Programming System also provides a plan-
ning base upon which can be spread an array consisting of the whole aggrega-
tion of weapons and support systems. Such a display shows force levels for
eight years beyond the current year and program costs for five years beyond
3
the current year. Thus depicted, military objectives can be viewed over an
extended range of time, which serves to ensure that a proper mix is at hand





U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Program
Change Control System in the Department of the Navy , NAVEXOS P-2416,
August, 1962, p. 1-6. Cited hereafter as NAVEXOS P-2416.
3
Department of Defense Directive, POD Programming System
,
No. 7045. 1 (October 30, 1964), 2.
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the Secretary of Defense, but to the planners and executives of the military
departments. Changes to this base are made only by the Secretary of
Defense (or the Deputy Secretary of Defense). Changes are made only after
an assessment that the proposed change represents a more satisfactory means
of meeting the planned objective in terms of cost effectiveness. The purpose
of the Programming System is "to aggregate these units in a manner which is
meaningful and convenient for top-level decision making. " The transition
from purpose to program management has assured the controllability that
provides for the requirements of informed decision making.
With all of its many advantages, program budgeting should not be
considered a budgetary panacea. There are problems which still confound
those involved in daily operation of the system. Accounting for costs over
longer periods of time is just one of such problems.
All things considered, the FYFS&FP has become the backbone of the
Programming System and is the principal method by which McNamara asserts
himself in military affairs. Hitch was brought in to do the planning. His
successor, Robert N. Anthony, wants to establish cost-based operating
2
budgets to close the loop. ' This chapter presents the program budget in
terms of Hitch's objective.
U. S. Department of Defense, Programming System for the Office
of the Secretary of Defense , Study report prepared by the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), May 31, 1962, p. 1-1.
2
Philip L. O'Connell, Associate Director, Financial Services, Office
of Navy Comptroller. Presentation for the Navy Graduate Financial Manage-
ment Program at The George Washington University, January 10, 1966.
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The Concept of the Programming System
The Objective
The establishment of a Program Budgeting System within the Depart-
ment of Defense can be thought of primarily as a management effort. Its goal
is to provide a unified defense program planned ahead for five years. This
length of time is 'short enough to make possible reasonably accurate estimates
and long enough to provide a good approximation of the full costs. " Under
ideal conditions, such a management system should reveal the total costs over
the projected life span of a weapon system. Because of the inherent difficulty
of long-term cost projection, five years was considered a comparatively
desirable time frame. It facilitates decision making for the Secretary of
Defense by relating costs and effectiveness for the entire range of military
2
weaponry. It reveals how much defense per dollar the United States is buy-
ing, and because of this fact the Five -Year Force Structure and Financial
Program has become the "heart" of the Programming System.
With economy serving as the key to efficient government operation,
the major objective of the Programming System has been to attempt to close
the "gap" between the planning and budgeting functions. (Refer to Table 1. )
The means to enable this are:
1. A program structure in terms of missions, forces, and weapon
and support systems.
Hitch, The Federal Accountant, XI, 35.




Major concern is with alternative Major concern is with functional
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Short time horizon --the next
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Provide a device for
integrating the two
Source: G. H. Fisher, The New OASD (Comptroller) Programming /Budgeting
Process
, op. cit. , p. 6.




2. The analytical comparison of alternatives.
3. A continually updated five-year force structure and financial
program.
4. Related year-round decision making on new program changes.
5. Progress reporting to test the validity and administration of
the plan.
Such a system would be geared to continuous program decision making
and not just to the annual budget cycle. A process would exist whereby mili-
tary force requirements could be translated into budget requests. Hopefully,
a decision to embark on a project becomes the decision to provide the funds
to carry it out.
The Functions
The purposes of the Program Budget System as it was conceived were
to improve management and to show what the government is attempting to
accomplish. Since the allocation of resources is essentially a political
process, a system was required to gather and analyze data on the national
objectives. Program budgeting begins with the structuring of the data and
concludes with cost -utility analysis that compares this utility (outputs) with
the cost of the resources (inputs). The total resource inputs are arranged
2
so the comparison of alternatives is meaningful.
The RAND Corporation, op. cit .
, p. 57.
Ibid.
, p. xii, passim.
I
24
The main advantage claimed for the program budget process over
that of the present budget is that it is designed in relation to the deci-
sion process and helps to make it more effective by clearly defining
the alternatives among which choices must be made, and creating an
information system that permits analytical appraisal of costs in rela-
tion to expected benefits. *
The end product of these objectives and functions has been the com-
bining of:
. . . the planning /programming and the financial management functions
in order to provide better tools and information for decision making by
the Secretary of Defense and his military advisor. This is done in such
a way that budget decisions will be program decisions, and program
decisions will be budget decisions. ^
A sound basis has now been provided for the preparation of the annual
budget. By keeping the current budget and the programs in alignment, it is
possible for the Secretary of Defense to ensure that various programs are
achievable as current commitments are assigned.
The Budgeting Concept
The program budget procedure leaves the traditional fiscal budget
unchanged. While the Congress has expressed interest in program budgeting
and has been duly impressed with the command over technical data that it has
given, the point has been clearly registered that the traditional budget format
should remain unchanged. Planning and programming may control the sub-
stance of the budget but not its form. After the Secretary of Defense has








into the conventional budget format. Table 2 demonstrates how correlation
is possible between the budget by appropriation title and the FYFS&FP for the
Department of the Navy.
Appropriations committees have been working with these same cate-
gories for more than a decade and have established a historical pattern for
forming judgments as to the validity of requests. The democratic processes
of budget review within the committees remains by nature incremental, frag-
2
mented, non -programmatic, and sequential. There have been many state-
ments by the Congress and particularly by the Appropriations committees
3
that a change to the basic budget process will not be acceptable. While these
statements indicate that the legislators are not in favor of a change in the
traditional format, none states why in such explicit terms as the following:
The tradition of reform in America is a noble one, not easily to be
denied. But in this case it is doomed to failure because it is aimed at
the wrong target. If the present budgetary process is rightly or wrongly
deemed unsatisfactory, then one must alter in some respect the political
system of which the budget is but an expression. It makes no sense to
speak as if one could make dramatic changes in budgeting without also
altering the distribution of influence. ^
The RAND Corporation, op. cit .
, p. 67.
2Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co. , 1964), p. 136.
3
See House of Representatives Report No. 1607 , 87th Cong. , 2d Sess.
(House Appropriations Committee Report on the Fiscal Year 1963, Depart-
ment of Defense Budget, April 13, 1962), pp. 4ff.
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I. Research and Development
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3, 543. 3 945. 3 110.
1. 8
37.
lote: The Department of the Navy has no elements in Program VIII.
ource: U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Budget
Digest, Fiscal Year 1966, NAVSOP-1355, November 30, 1965,
pp. 40-41.
ABLE 2. --Correlation between the budget by appropriation title and the Five-








































Although the President has the authority to propose his budget in any
form he may choose, it is the Congress that determines how the funds will be
appropriated and, therefore, how they will be accounted for. Fortunately,
one of the virtues of the Programming System is that it does not require a
change in the budget format.
The Structural Components of the Programming System
Programs and Program Elements
The Department of Defense Programming System currently consists
of eight major programs which are combinations of activities having common
missions. Each individual program represents a related group of program
elements considered together for decision purposes because they either sup-
port one another or are close substitutes. Major programs represent the
primary mission to be performed.
Table 3 shows the eight major programs with representative examples
of the elements comprising them, fitted to the mission-oriented military
requirements of the Defense Department in support of overall defense policy.
Table 4 shows these same programs relating the mission of National Defense
2
Policy to the traditional budget format through the flexible program elements.
Hitch, Decision Making for Defense
, p. 34. A more complete dis-
cussion of the composition of the major programs may be found on pp. 35-38.
2
During the first week in January, 1966, 1, 087 of these program
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Program elements are defined as integrated activities- -the combina-
tions of men, equipment, and installations whose effectiveness can be related
to our national security objectives. The purpose of the orogram element is
to package these units so that they may be meaningfully presented to the
decision maker. For purposes of illustration: The U. S. POLARIS missile,
with its associated fleet ballistic missile system, is an element within the
aggregation titled Missile Forces, Sea Based , and this in turn makes up a
portion of the major Program I-
-
Strategic Retaliatory Forces . Through the
weapon system elements, such as POLARIS, or through elements consisting
of force units, the means are provided by which missions are accomplished.
The total of all program elements constitute the entire defense establishment.
Cost Analysis and Cost Categories
The program element serves its basic function in permitting cost-
utility (cost-effectiveness) analyses. The entire programming problem seems
to rest on the preciseness of element costing. Unless the individual figures
for research and development, investment, and operation of the element can
be accurately foretold, the most economical or efficient means for completing
a mission cannot be known. The array of alternatives must be uniformly and
completely costed in these terms to provide meaningful choices among ele-
ments, programs, or program changes.




The question of the proper distribution of support activity costs has
been particularly troublesome. While these costs are not output-oriented,
they must be allocated to the proper program elements. When one operating
base provides services to more than one force unit, support costs must be
correctly divided between them. Without a reliability in cost distribution,
one cost analysis cannot be compared with another.
Within the Program Budget structure, planning decisions are made
after comparing projected costs and effectiveness of feasible program
choices. In such comparisons, a methodical examination of alternatives
is made in terms of quantitative estimates of cost and of the expected
military benefits ("effectiveness") to be derived from the systems.
Programming needs a knowledge of the dollar requirements for meet-
ing manpower, materiel, and facility needs. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) therefore requires that the cost of each element be submitted
to cover five-year periods, and that these data be broken down in the follow-
ing ways:
1. By total obligational authority and expenditures.
2. By appropriation account and budget title, in line with the pres-
ent budget structure.
3. By the three broad categories of costs: research and develop-






3NAVEXOS P-2416, op. cit. , pp. 2-9.
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With adequate costing representing such an essential skill, it is
necessary to further define each of these program cost categories.
Research and Development - -those program costs primarily asso-
ciated with research and development efforts, including the development
of a new or improved capability to the point where it is ready for ooera-
tional use. These costs include equipment costs funded under the
RDT&E appropriations and related military construction appropriation
costs. . . .
Investment - -those program costs required beyond the development
phase to introduce into operational use a new capability, to procure ini-
tial, additional or replacement equipment for operational forces or to
provide for major modifications of an existing capability. They include
procurement appropriation costs except those associated with the oper-
ating category defined below, and all military construction appropriation
costs except those associated with research and development.
. . .
Operating - -those program costs necessary to operate and maintain
the capability. These costs include military personnel, operation and
maintenance and recurring procurement appropriation costs (such as
replenishment spares). . . . *
The total cost would be the sum of the three program cost categories
as is represented in Figure 1. The total cost projection arises as each of the
cost categories is shown in the time schedule in which they would likely occur.
This provides the cumulative cost of the program element for its effective life.
It must be remembered that costing is done on the basis of a peacetime
preparation for war or deterring war. Interests are mainly on peacetime, not
wartime, costs. Efforts are directed toward utilizing the resources available
for national security in peacetime.
U. S. Department of Defense Directive, POD Programming System
,
No. 7045. 1, October 30, 1964, pp. 3-4.
2
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense




















































In principle, the wartime costs are relevant. In practice, we can
frequently ignore them. . . . The major economic problem is to maxi-
mize the capability of these forces by using resources efficiently before
the war starts ...
The Five-Year Force Structure
and Financial Program
The combination of elements, programs, and forces arranged over
five successive fiscal years as formally approved by the Secretary of Defense
comprises the FYFS&FP. All of the program data with the accompanying
description of the forces, their tasks, and missions is binding for program-
2
ming purposes on each of the military services. It was initially intended
3
that all program information be updated every other month. This would
enable the FYFS&FP to remain a continuously effective document, capable of
forming the backbone of the Defense Department's annual budget submission.
When budget time arrived, the first-year increment of the Five-Year Force
Structure and Financial Program would be taken as the base to determine the
4
financial requirements to be stated in the annual defense budget.
Except in unusual instances, new programs will not be introduced
in the presentation of the budget, and financial envelopes or budgetary
limitations will no longer be established at the time of the budget call.
The budget activity point of view for programs which have already been
approved and whose total tentative financial requirements are known
through the updated version of the "Five Year Force Structure and








, p. 34. The RAND Corporation, op. cit . , p. 63.




To display long-range implications and to provide a basis for financial
management support, the DOD Programming System uses the FYFS&FP to
provide a planning horizon projected ahead eight years in terms of force
structure and five years for financial levels. The approved FYFS&FP is also
the base for submission of proposed program changes. In order to maintain
the FYFS&FP in an up-to-date status, it is necessary to incorporate a con-
tinuous review process. The Program Change Proposal System was developed
to help attain this objective.
Program Change Proposal System
In order to provide flexibility in the FYFS&FP, a formal change pro-
posal system was introduced. This enables the dynamic changes often
required in military operations. The Program Change Proposal (PCP) Sys-
tem is a general mechanism of programming, decision making, and control.
It affords the Department of Defense a systematic procedure for making addi-
tions, deletions, or modifications to the approved FYFS&FP at any time.
Prior to its adaptation, program decisions were usually delayed until the
time of the periodic budget reviews. Thus, the FYFS&FP with the PCP Sys-
tem has provided the mechanism for freeing program decisions from the
annual budget cycle.
The PCP, as forwarded over the signature of the service Secretary
for approval by the Secretary of Defense, contains fully developed proposals
The RAND Corporation, op. cit. , p. 65.
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with pertinent supporting data. The submission contains estimates of costs
and effectiveness over a long time frame. Also included as an integral part
of the paperwork are alternative considerations and possible trade-off items.
When a PCP is received by the OSD staff, the assembled information
permits a review before it is forwarded to the Office of System Analysis for
further evaluation. At this level it is possible to view competing systems in
the interest of the total defense program without questions of service juris-
diction. All review and evaluation data, including controversy, are then for-
warded with the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the PCP is presented
to the Secretary of Defense.
A PCP may be submitted by a military department at any time. Such
PCP's usually are the result of a major study conducted by the individual
services and/or their research affiliates in the interest of furthering service
program objectives. With the introduction of new program elements or with
changes to the existing elements, each service hopes to enhance entity capa-
bilities and further the long-range objectives established by its own leaders.
Any element which deviates beyond prescribed "thresholds" from the
schedule and costs projected when the element was initially approved causes
2
an additional PCP submission.
Novick, op. cit .
, p. 22.





When the assumptions of cost and progress upon which approval
was based become seriously invalid, the system automatically brings
the matter to the attention of the Secretary of Defense through "manage-
ment by exception. " Program slippages, cost overruns, or failure to
meet reliability goals may change the character of the program to the
degree that it is no longer the best on a cost-effectiveness basis, and
reorientation or cancellation may be required. *
A PCP may also be required as a result of program review at the OSD
level with the request handed down through the Secretary's Tentative Force
Guidance, generally occurring in May. Through this process it becomes
possible for the Secretary to analyze the resource effects of tentative
decisions.
When a change desired by a service is below the thresholds established
by the Secretary of Defense, it may be approved by the Secretary of the Mili-
tary Department concerned. However, such a change must be able to be met
2
by existing funds. Table 5 presents the current thresholds.
The Functioning of the Programming System
The Secretary of Defense provides guidance to the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Directors of the DOD agencies in mat-
ters of national security policies. As these officials establish policy within
their own departments and agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop the
1
Ibid . Here "management by exception" refers to the fact that execu-
tive attention is not ordinarily concerned with results that conform with













New program elements in Program VI
Changes to program elements in Progr. VI
Changes to R&D category in program
elements of other programs
Investment
Any increase Any increase in
any fiscal year
Any Any
$10 million $25 million
$10 million $25 million
Approval for procurement and deployment
of items











Changes to total country non-country
programs
Manpower
Changes in total year -end military or civil-
ian manpower spaces authorized for a DOD
component
Forces
















$20 million $50 million
Any Any
% or 1 million in any year,
whichever is greater
Any increase Any increase
Any fiscal year
Any
aDuring the first six months of the current fiscal year, the first program year
is the budget year. During the last six months of the current fiscal year,
the first program year is the budget year plus one.
^Total program cost includes first program year plus all subsequent progr. yrs
cFor military family housing construction projects, these thresholds are
applicable to each DOD component total.
Source: DOD Directive 7045. 1, October 30, 1964, p. 8.
TABLE 5 - Thresholds established by the Secretary of Defense
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military objectives and plans to achieve the objectives. These plans assign
missions and tasks for performance by the commanders in the field, in addi-
tion to specifying the necessary forces to carry them out over the next five
years.
Setting the Stage
By means of mergers, consolidations, centralizations, and the crea-
tion of several new functions within his span of control, McNamara has not
only given the Defense Department unification, but he has pulled it more
closely about the office which he holds. From the beginning these actions left
little doubt of his clear intention to use the Secretary's extensive powers to
make decisions that were to have profound tactical and strategic corisequences.
As a result of his efficient management alignments, McNamara is conscious
of, conversant with, and in control of every development regarding the defense
of this nation.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this restructuring in the Pentagon
was that of providing for the centralization of power as necessary to undertake
the task of military financial management. Hitch soon provided the link
between planning and budgeting to relate forces and their resource costs to
major missions. Systems analysis provided the analytical foundation for
making objective decisions among the alternatives in carrying out these
missions.
It now remains for the Secretary of Defense to use these tools as he
plans and directs the efforts of the military establishment toward defense on
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a unified basis. He must ensure that the data coming to him are in every
respect relevant, precise, and thorough. The guidance which the Secretary
of Defense is capable of furnishing to start this billion dollar chain reaction
is only as good as the information which he is provided.
Enabling the Programming Objective
To accomplish the objective of "closing the gap' 1 between the planning
and budgeting functions, seven enabling requirements were established.
These support the programming system's main objective, which can only be
as adequate to its task as they in turn are to theirs:
1. Planning is oriented around major missions. Program planning
is on the basis of military missions, which cut across organizational
lines instead of being based on single service plans and priorities.
2. There must be an ability to relate resource inputs to military
outputs. The resources with their costs must be identifiable when they
become components of military forces. Programming is designed to
provide both financial and nonfinancial estimates of the resource inputs
required.
3. It is necessary to coordinate long-range planning with budgeting.
Budget decisions must be compatible with long-range programming deci-
sions. Long-range plans must also be compatible with the forecast or
resource availability. To transition from long-range military planning
to short-range budgeting, programs and their costs are projected five




4. The continuous appraisal of programs is essential. A mech-
anism for changing programs whenever a need exists is a requirement.
5. The control of approved programs must be exercised through a
system of progress reports. Timely corrective action must be taken
as significant deviations from approved plans are made known.
6. The system must provide both custodial and financial informa-
tion in a form suitable for making cost-utility analysis studies of alter-
native force structures. Cost must be accurate enough for program
comparison but responsive enough to allow frequent studies without
greatly increased workloads.
7. A long-range goal is the establishment of an integrated manage-
ment information system. This will provide information for the pro-
gramming system as well as for any other needs now being served.
Budgeting- -The Final Phase
It must be realized that each of these structuring, organizing, plan-
ning, and programming activities are valueless without the required funding
to carry them out. Before any execution is possible, before any commitment
is made, or before any obligation is incurred, there must be an appropriation
of funds specifically authorized for defense programs.
The annual budget process represents the final phase in the program-
ming system. The Navy's budget preparation begins some eleven months
The Navy Programming Manual , op. cit. , p. 2-2.
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before each fiscal year. At this time the Comptroller of the Navy calls for
budget estimates from the various Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Depart-
ment and a cut-off date is established for programs which will be included in
the budget estimate.
All approved programs that are within the "Five Year Force
Structure and Financial Plan ' as of the established cut-off date are
included in a basic budget submission. If some program changes
have not received final approval and if approved changes are received
subsequent to the cut-off date, it is necessary to include these in an
addendum Budget Submission. By use of subsequent amendments,
approved program changes are then moved from the addendum to the
Basic Budget.
This process is necessary because at the same time the budget estimate is
being developed, revisions are taking place within the program change sys-
tem.
After many thousands of man-hours of work, budget estimates are
forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy for review, approval, or disapproval.
The one firm date in this sequence is October 1, when the service request
must be submitted to the Secretary of Defense. Here individual service
budgets are reviewed within the overall defense budget objectives. This
review is done jointly with Bureau of the Budget analysts.
When tentative budget decisions are reached at OSD level, they are
presented to the services by 'Subject/Issue Papers. " The service Secretaries
are then able to appeal any tentative decision with which they may not agree.
C. L. Chipley, Jr. , SC, Lt. , USN, "Budgeting: A Never Ending
Job, " Monthly Newsletter Magazine of the U. S. Navy Supply Corps, XXVII,
No. 7 (July, 1964), 10.
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This "reclama" is made through the submission of position papers to the
Secretary of Defense. A final decision is then made on each issue and the
defense budget is prepared for submission as a part of the President's budget.
In January of each year the President submits his budget to the Congress
where again analysis is made of the defense appropriation request before the
Budget of the United States evolves. Formal budget hearings are held in
Congress at which time the service Secretaries and senior military officers
testify on the overall department budget. Military representatives are then
questioned on details of the programs and the requirements to support these
2programs in the budget document. The game does not end here. Many fine
works have been prepared on the related budgetary processes of authorization,
3
appropriation, apportionment, and the audit which follows. Figure 2 shows
the results of the present state of the art in military budgeting as compared
with the total federal budget.
Reprogramming Action
Congress first authorizes the appropriation of funds for defense and
then establishes the amount available for apportionment in each of the appro-
priations. The budget estimates submitted to the Congress are requests for






Refer to Wildavsky, op. cit. ; Ott and Ott, op. cit . ; Burkhead, o
cit . ; or Murray L. Wiedenbaum, Federal Budgeting --The Choice of Govern-







1940 1950 1960 1965 1966
Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc., "Management Study of the U.S. Congress,"
NBC News Broadcast, November 24, 1965, p. 37; "Partial Text of
Johnson Budget Message, " Evening Star (Washington), January 24,
1966, p. A-8. 1940 1950 I960 1965 1966
Total Fed. Budget




1.6 18.4 47.5 56.6 63.3*
7. 5 21. 1 29. 41.8 49. 5*
* - Estimated
Fig. 2. --A comparison of defense spending and the total federal budget
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funds based on a projection of the expected requirements for the next fiscal
year, a year still some six months away. Should actual defense needs during
the year differ from the estimates, a reprogramming action is required to
adjust these funds. Within established financial limitations, reprogramming
may be authorized by the Secretary of Defense. If these "thresholds" are
reached, approval must come from the Congress. In either case, a report
of this action must be submitted to the Congress on December 31.
Approval of the cognizant Congressional committees also is gen-
erally required for changes in major items of ships, aircraft, and
missiles or any other program deemed to be of special Congressional
interest.
The Inherent Design Limitations ^
In a study led by David Novick, head of the RAND Cost Analysis
Department, a thorough look is taken at "operational problems of the Pro-
gram Budget. These include:
1. Identifying a group of activities as a single program or a pro-
gram element and then bringing the applicable data together to make a
decision.
2. Allocating costs after introducing program budgeting since a
completely new cost identification determination will be required.
3. Keeping elements separated even after their identification, since
many are interdependent or contain spill -over which must be traced out.
U. S. Department of the Navy Budget Digest, op. cit. , p. 32.
Navy Programming Manual , op. cit . , p. 5-7.
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4. Coordinating two side-by-side budgeting structures develops
great amounts of paperwork as well as compounding decisions.
5. Centralizing decision making, resulting in centralization of
authority. When thresholds are set too low, nearly all decisions must
come from top levels.
6. Withholding of alternatives on cost -utility analysis studies lead-
ing to incorrect decisions. Rival agencies through competition help to
encourage alternative proposals.
7. Neglecting uncertainties, thus leading to too conservative an
approach. With program budgeting there is a tendency to make deci-
sions more rational and less responsive to bargaining.
Even Hitch, the author of the Programming System, warns of several
inherent weaknesses:
1. Designing tools and data requirements for use by the Secretary
of Defense may be precluding the needs of lower level managers.
2. Admitting that procurement policies and procedures cannot be
managed in terms of program elements.
3. Programming designed as a continuous process is pulled back
onto an annual cycle by budgeting. The ability to implement a change
at any time is thus negated by timing requirements.
2
4. Measuring costs is as yet an imperfect art.
The RAND Corporation, op. cit. , pp. 223-232.
2




Several overriding reflections prevail from the data presented in this
chapter. The first is the number of referrals made to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Decisions are made at lower levels, surely. But
programs cannot be formulated or carried out unless they are directed by a
responsible authority. Neither can they be related unless one superior
authority has an overall responsibility. Secondly, many of the old informa-
tion requirements still continue. Programming has added increased require-
ments without demitting any of the old ones. Thirdly, even with the arrival
of greater expertise in project cost categories over longer time frames,
costs are calculated on a peacetime, not a wartime, basis. Fourthly, while
the FYFS&FP is fundamentally a simple tool, the processes of change, review,
and modification have become highly complex and formalized systems.
Annual budgeting requirements have forced the FYFS&FP to conform to
precisely scheduled procedures.
Yet with all these limitations, risks, and weaknesses, program
budgeting will serve the needs of the Defense Department better than any
other system. There seems little doubt in the minds at the Pentagon that it
is "here to stay. "
Chapter III will expand upon the additional problem load placed on
the Programming System by the emergence of limited war requirements.

CHAPTER III
RESPONDING TO EMERGING LIMITED WAR REQUIREMENTS
Facing Economic and Political Realities-
The National Scope
The Federal Government has worked toward the achievement of sev-
eral national economic goals in the last decade. Following World War II,
the impetus was upon monetary policy as a control to achieve economic sta-
bility. More recently, our nation's leaders have relied heavily upon fiscal
policies. Here the desire has been to stimulate the economy while stabiliz-
ing prices and achieving low unemployment levels.
Fiscal Policy
Discretionary fiscal policy requires the maintenance of a pre-
established balance between tax and expenditure throughout the year. After
estimating the rate of private spending, the government should ideally set its
own expenditures at a level which, assuming full employment, achieves the
public' 8 desired resource allocation. This done, taxes are set according
to the size of the government expenditure, thus allowing for full employment
2
without inflation. There is seen a very delicate balance in even this simpli-
fied model. Introducing all the variables of the economy, this structure







depends upon intricate interrelationships, forecast estimates, automatic
stabilizers, and more than a little luck. Heavy reliance is placed "on the
judgment of the Executive and Congress to choose the proper level of tax
rates and government spending ..." The sensitivity of these requirements
is magnified by the criticism from minority members of the Congress as
well as the continuous pressures for reelection from the majority.
A Budget Ceiling
Without much more discussion it becomes evident that, once the
"balance is struck '--once government expenditures have been established
by the President and his budget has been sent to the Congress, once the
tax level has been set and the President has put in motion the machinery to
provide the desired stimulus toward a fully employed, non-inflationary,
rising standard of living--a true "ceiling" has, in fact, been applied to gov-
ernment spending.
The FYFS&FP represents your plan for one year, but still you
have a balancing operation with White House policy and economic
conditions. . . . Basic economic conditions determine the defense
budget- -if this puts a ceiling on it, it's back to the drawing board to
obtain what we can of the force structure that we need. ^
Once Congressional appropriation bills are signed into law by the
President, it becomes the solemn duty of the Secretary of Defense to uphold
the budget with its now more than theoretical ceiling throughout the ensuing







departments and agencies. The remainder of this paper is devoted to looking
at the results of these pressures and how they have come to affect the
FYFS&FP.
McNamara has, more or less conclusively, proven that he can make
the FYFS&FP perform successfully under a ceiling limitation during condi-
tions of semipeace. Our present question must be: Is it logical to expect that
the FYFS&FP, composed of program elements costed on a peacetime basis,
can provide for the continually increasing exigencies of prolonged war and
still remain within this spending constraint?
Within the Department of Defense this budget ceiling results in greatly
magnified pressures when new unprogrammed requirements arise in periods
of crisis. The reaction is to tighten up, to defer, to cancel, to reprogram,
to utilize emergency funding, and ultimately to come to depend upon supple-
mental funding for the expenses which cannot be allowed to be recognized in
the annual budget as the price of rapidly expending conflict. These solutions
all require an increase in paperwork, undue frustrations, and the loss of
vital time.
A fundamentally critical failing during such times is that of forcing
the job to be done with less than optimal equipment. Technological advances
have resulted in far better weapons than are now in the possession of men
actively engaged in fighting our limited war. Improved tactics call for more
and better supporting units. Mobility has proven it can win battles as well as




."only in terms of its potential contribution to our strategy,
considering both its cost and its military effectiveness, as well as
the relative cost/effectiveness of other alternatives. " This is a suc-
cinct explanation of one of McNamara's most controversial policies
designed to preclude entering a full systems development without the
technology, costs, and schedule fully in hand.
These ideas have not just come out of our actions in Vietnam. They
were well-founded concepts many years ago which have now been proven.
These "deficiencies in our strategic posture can be removed only by substan-
2
tially increased defense expenditures. " Because we must maintain oresent
forces while producing new forces, military costs by necessity will continue
to rise. The heavy burden is cushioned by the growth in the gross national
3
product, but the price of survival is not low.
Adjusting for New Unprogrammed Requirements --
POD Procedures
Unless the United States of America were to declare a state of
national emergency or to issue a declaration of war, the rapidly changing
demands arising from limited war must be funded within the DOD through
two basic alternatives. The alternatives are simple; their processes, com-
plex. Either the funds previously authorized and appropriated by the
"Can R&D Solve Tactical Warfare Problems?" Armed Forces
Management
,
XI, No. 6 (March, 1965), 54-55.
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Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Prospect for America (Garden City,






Congress are channeled to new unprogrammed requirements or it becomes
necessary to ask for "new money. "
Additional PCP's for
Requirement Changes
New operating requirements put pressures upon the military services
to attempt reorientation of presently approved projects. Changes in require-
ments, as well as the additional operating facility needs, increase the flow
of PCP submissions adding to the already overworked paper processing
capabilities. PCP's represent the prescribed route to be followed before any
budgetary action may be taken. Each new requirement must be submitted for
approval as a component part of the FYFS&FP. Only in matters approaching
extremism can this approval be obtained through the more expedient memo-
randum procedure with the PCP following after the fact.
The reaction time
. . . imposes an increased requirement. We
may meet them in two or three days on a crash basis --taking consid-
erably longer on others as a consequence. In come cases it has been
done by memo to the Secretary of Defense, where we explain it is
imperative to obtain this. This amounts to a way around- -and must
be followed up by a formal PCP.
Interview with Captain J. R. Johnson, U. S. N. , Head, Budget
Analysis Branch, Office of General Planning and Programming, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, November 12, 1965. The contributions of Captain
Johnson to this study were especially valuable because of his strong belief
that there was a valuable thesis to be sought. He provided materials beyond
my grasp and had the patience to answer many inquiries over a five -month
period.
2Remarks of Vice Admiral E. P. Holmes, U. S. N. , Director, Navy
Program Planning, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, January 5, 1966, at
a briefing presented for the Honorable Charles F. Baird, then designate
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management).
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The hours spent in the preparation of intricate proposal details fre-
quently do not provide the desired approval results sought by the services.
There is also reason to believe that much of the detail is unjustified.
The present system is burdened with unnecessary detail . . .
PCP's must contain sufficient detail to update the FYFS&FP--substan-
tially more detail than is typically needed for decision making . . .
nearly 50 percent of the PCP's submitted are rejected or substantially
modified, the requirement that PCP's accompany the original proposal
results in much wasted work. Another example of unnecessary detail
is the excessive reproduction of the same information among the docu-
ments comprising the process.
The Programming System still remains a useful mechanism for top-
level decision making. At the times when individual military services are
hardest pressed to fulfill the needs of operating commanders, they must also
become enmeshed in the processes of submitting change proposals to support
their active requirements. "Program budgeting is not of use, or for use,
2below the level of the OSD, ;i says one source. Another authority states:
"Programming is a tool for the Secretary of Defense--it is not for the
services. It is not easy for the individual services. ..." This is borne
Draft memorandum from McKinsey & Company, Inc. , Management
Consultants, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), later for-
warded for comment to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
by the ASD(C) memorandum of January 6, 1966, p. 4.
2
Dick Li. Jackson, Director, Progress Reports and Statistics Divi-
sion, Office of the Director of Budget; and reports, Office of Navy Comptrol-
ler. Presentation for the Navy Graduate Financial Management Program at
The George Washington University, December 6, 1965.
3
Captain Richard G. Schutt, U. S. N. , Director, Program Change Con-
trol Division, Office of General Planning and Programming, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations. Presentation for the Navy Graduate Financial




out by the fact that the Programming System provides no direct contribution
to day-to-day management at the service level.
While the array of program elements facilitates appraisal of how
weapon and support systems are combined to provide a force structure,
this aggregation must be translated into other terms to be usable by a
functional staff manager or a field commander.
The PCP process has a degree of involvement for the individual
services which amounts to one of the most time-consuming requirements
placed upon them. It is a requirement in the true sense of the word, for, as
has been indicated, the service benefits are marginal. The process seems
to be one of a true bureaucratic nature where progression occurs in rings of
ever-decreasing concentric circles. As urgency increases, the number of
PCP's increases. As the numbers increase, so do the workloads at all lev-
els. A criticism made in the interim report submitted by McKinsey & Com-
pany, Inc.
, was that PCP preparation prescribes:
. . .
essentially the same approach to documenting, reviewing,
and approving both major and minor issues. A review of nearly 500
PCP's
. . .
indicates no correlation between the size of importance
for the decision and the amount of detailed documentation generated.
Moreover, the Secretary of Defense must approve every individual
program change proposal that breaks current thresholds, without
regard to its significance. 2
Written comments provided by Mr. D. V. Schnurr, Associate
Director of Budget, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, to the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Comptroller) on the DOD Programming System, September
20, 1965, p. 2. This paper by Mr. Schnurr is referenced frequently herein
as "Comments by Mr. Schnurr. "
2
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) memorandum for the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and others, January 6, 1966,
p. 3. A memo of September 30, 1965, from the ASD(C) announced a study of
the management decision -making process within the DOD to be started
October 1, with contractual assistance of McKinsey & Company, Inc.
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Additionally, the McKinsey report was highly critical of the fact that
the Defense Department relies on individual PCP's as a means for reaching
decisions when the Programming System is based on the premise that each
decision should cover broadly aggregated issues permitting considerations
of alternative and trade-off opportunities.
, . . Individual PCP's do not meet the requirements of integrated
decision making because each ordinarily covers only a piece of
broader indivisible area. In addition, PCP's often do not identify all
the alternatives to be considered or present adequate analysis of those
identified.
Use of Existing Assets
The first option to be thoroughly exploited, at the direction of the
Secretary of Defense, is that of utilizing funds which are presently available.
Until the possibility of diverting these funds to new programs is fully
exhausted, the Secretary cannot justifiably ask for new money through supple-
mental appropriations. To do so would be to perform the duties of his office
with less than complete compliance. The brunt of the burden is thereby
placed directly on each of the military services. This is evidenced by a
memorandum from McNamara during one of the periods of most rapid escala-
tion of the Vietnam conflict.
. . .
until such time as we can predict with reasonable accuracy the
amount of financial supplerrent required to accomplish this objective,
we will utilize emergency funds, transfer authority and reprogramming
actions to the maximum possible extent . . .
^bid.
, p. 7.
2Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the




One of the aspects which cause the efforts of the Programming System
to seem most futile is a realization that even after a program change proposal
is approved as a part of the FYFS&FP, a program decision is not a budget
decision. Program approval does not automatically constitute the authority
to commit or obligate funds.
The program budget was to do away with the priority basis of budgeting
by looking at the aggregated requirements of the defense establishment as a
2
whole. Yet, as the FYFS&FP for the current year is adjusted for economic
conditions, prior to being sent to the President as the Annual Defense Budget,
or after the requests in the President's budget are reduced by the Congress,
priorities once again come to play their roles.
Allegedly, this is now done by highly scientific methods and not purely
by value judgments as in the past. While the final budget formulation is still
in the hands of the Secretary of Defense (during the OSD-Bureau of the Budget
Mark-Up), these decisions come down in the form of Subject/Issues. They
are "reclamaed" within five working days by the services through position
papers, but in the end some priority decision at the OSD level is made which
defers the project to the following year.
To obtain funds to start immediately on a rush project, it is some-
times decided to defer a program previously approved. This occurs when it
Department of Defense Directive 7045. 1, op. cit .
, p. 11.
2




would not be feasible to wait for appropriations in the following fiscal year.
Or, instead of a deferral, there may well be complete cancellation of a pro-
gram as a means of releasing funds for other uses. In either deferral or can-
cellation, reprogramming action must be taken to move funds from previously
approved projects to the newly approved ones.
There are other cases where items strictly controlled by the Con-
gressional subcommittees cannot be reprogrammed. Items in Military Con-
struction are the most common example. Press statements may often lead
to confusion in this regard.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's slash of nearly half
this year's military construction program foreshadows a new defense
budget shorn of anything which cannot be justified by military necessity
and the Viet Nam war. McNamara signaled this . . in saying that in-
definite postponement of $620 million in construction of homes for serv-
ice families, barracks, and other like facilities is "symptomatic" of
his approach to the new defense budget now being put together . . .
McNamara said that his department is eliminating or deferring every-
thing that can possibly be sidetracked ...
Actually the Military Construction funds involved in the $620 million deferral
will not be reprogrammed for uses other than those originally specified. In
this case, $620 million of projects will be deferred, thus reducing near -term
military expenditures; the funds, however, remain available. In this manner
Interview with Mr. D. V. Schnurr, Associate Director of Budget,
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, January 31, 1966. Mr. Schnurr has con-
tributed many sound ideas in addition to his expert assistance in technical
areas of this paper.
2
"Cut in Projects Indicates Defense Budget Pinch, " Evening Star
(Washington), December 21, 1965, p. 1.
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it is possible for the Secretary of Defense to manipulate defense spending so
that the total expenditures do not appear to be so great.
Reprogramming Actions
The Fiscal 1966 defense budget was prepared at a time when it was
not possible to forecast the current degree of involvement in Vietnam. Some
action is therefore necessary to assure that the Fiscal 1966 financial plan
will continue to suoport U. S. forces in this war.
Shortly after funds are made available by the Congress, a DD Form
1414 must be submitted to the Congress providing them with an estimated
baseline of how money is to be spent in terms of quantities to be procured
and the associated dollar amounts involved. Should existing funds be subse-
quently made available within the Department of Defense, either by deferral
or cancellation of previously authorized projects, a formal change to the
original baseline must be made. This is accomplished by the submission of
a DD Form 1415 requesting reprogramming action. This request for repro-
gramming action must follow whenever a change in quantity or in dollar
amount is made to the original estimate (above the established thresholds).
The Form 1415 shows the original Congressional approval, the amount of
change requested, and the proposed total as revised (both quantities and
dollars).
Department of Defense Directive 7250. 5, "Reprogramming of
Appropriated Funds, r March 4, 1963, pp. Iff.
I
60
In most reprogramming actions the Secretary of Defense can notify
the Congress after the fact by way of the Form 1415. In other categories
(where there is a specific interest on the part of the Congress) prior approval
of concerned committees must be obtained. This is infrequently given in the
case of Military Construction.
A DD Form 1416 is submitted at the end of each six-month period.
This is a status report listing all line items of programs, including repro-
gramming actions as of the end of the period.
Two other methods of financing are also available. These occur on
a routine basis each year:
The use of free assets --items bought and paid for by a service
from a prior year program which are no longer required and do not
need to be replaced. These may be sold for reimbursement to a for-
eign country and the funds used for additional expenditures.
The use of recoupments --when initial estimates of funding are
made, should an error exist on the high side; or if costs of produc-
2
tion decrease, the overfunded balance is brought forward.
Emergency Funds
Of the three actions which can be conducted through the emergency
fund, two are available from existing asset sources previously appropriated
by the Congress. The first allows the Secretary of Defense, with the approval
Schnurr, op. cit . Ibid .
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of the Bureau of the Budget, to transfer $125 million from the emergency fund
to any other Defense appropriation. This would be done specifically when a
major research, development, test, and evaluation breakthrough was deemed
to exist. Secondly, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to transfer up to
an additional $150 million from any appropriation account through the emer-
2gency func to another appropriation. This may be done should the Secretary
determine that funds can be "wisely, profitably, and practically used in the
interest of national defense; provided, that any such transfer shall not exceed
3
7 percent of the appropriation from which transferred. " Both of these emer-
gency fund actions would be utilized to permit more rapid progress in
research and development projects. They would permit accelerated develop-
ment should a scientific breakthrough come earlier than expected.
The third emergency fund transfer is authorized by the Congress, but
no funds are appropriated for its purpose. It would most logically be consid-
ered in the category of new monies. "Transfers of up to $200 million under
the terms of the Emergency Fund are authorized if such is vital to the secur-
4
ity of the United States. " Here the Secretary of Defense is authorized to
again transfer from any appropriation account through the emergency fund to
any other account but, in addition, he must promptly report such transfers to
the Appropriations Committees of the Congress. This form of transfer











functions primarily as a readiness requirement backstop. Even more flexi-
bility may be provided should the need for increased readiness become imper-
ative. Section 512 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act permits
the President to authorize deficiency spending. If the President were to
make such a determination in the interest of national defense, he may except
appropriations, funds, or contract authorizations for military functions under




When operational requirements so far exceed appropriations that exist'
ing assets cannot possibly meet the need, a supplemental appropriation
request becomes mandatory. Without it programs must face cancellation
and support to front lines cannot exist.
Such a requirement initiated the first supplemental appropriation for
the war in Vietnam. The amount of $700 million for the fiscal year 1965 was
requested by the President in a special message to the Congress on May 4,
2
1965. As House-Joint Resolution 447 of May 5, 1965, became Public Law
89-18, these funds were appropriated for the Department of Defense
U. S. Congress, Department of Defense Appropriations Act
,
Public Law 38-446, Section 512, p. 6.




Emergency Fund, Southeast Asia. Transfer authority was given to the
Secretary of Defense after a determination of necessity was issued by the
President. The Secretary could then transfer funds as needed from this
emergency fund account to the Operation and Maintenance, Procurement, or
Military Construction accounts, provided the Armed Services and Appropri-
ations Committees were notified immediately under the reporting provisions
established by reprogramming procedures.
The Fiscal 1966 budget did not make any additional provisions for
increased expenditures in Vietnam. It became necessary to appropriate
$1.7 billion to the "Emergency Fund, Southeast Asia" (under Public Law
89-213) for transfer to the other appropriations of the Department of Defense
2
as determined necessary by the Defense Secretary.
In the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1966, the drain of operating
requirements caused some overprogramming in anticipation of additional
appropriations. Another supplemental appropriation had been determined to
be necessary. Internal struggle in budgeting areas reached feverish levels
as financial managers tried to "borrow 1 ' from approved programs, yet keep
from cancelling other essential ones. Many interim solutions were required.
The Chief of Naval Operations created an ad hoc committee to document
U.S., Congress, Senate, 89th Cong. , 1st Sess. , Report 176,
May 5, 1965.
2
The $1.7 billion appropriation had all the characteristics of a "sup-
plemental, " thus allowing transfer at the discretion of the Secretary of
Defense. However, since the Budget of the United States was not readied until




unfunded requirements that became known as the Mother Hubbard Group"
(designed to fill bare cupboards). This group compiled a collection of
known requirements established on the premise that funding must be forth-
coming if our military forces were to continue fighting a war. It also estab-
lished a justification for a Navy share in any supplemental appropriation,
and aligned priorities. First were the projects where needs were immediate
and where there could be no delay in obtaining funding. Next came the proj-
ects which needed ftmds within the fiscal year in order to continue. Finally,
there were the projects that required funds in order to implement contingency
2
plans or that were required for buildups.
On January 19, 1966, the third supplemental appropriation for Vietnam
in the amount of $12. 7 billion was requested. This would be, theoretically,
sufficient to cover the remainder of Fiscal 1966 and to provide long lead
items to support operations in Vietnam in 1967.
Once again is shown the Administration's intent of excluding the costs
of this war from the regular budget. As a consequence, the inflexibility of
the FYFS&FP is once again emphasized. The complicated processes of PCP
submission, the involved reprogramming actions, and the holding back of
funds which reduce programs to a minimal level in the attempt to conserve,
all add their own special complications.
Johnson, op. cit. Ibid.
3




If the true meaning of the situation were known, perhaps it might be
seen that the Executive was attempting to keep the expenses of the war hidden
from the public and to delay its cost in time as much as possible for political
reasons.
Vietnam expenses coming from three supplemental appropriations
are carefully isolated in an unusual breakout which runs through the
budget; yet this conceals how much of the remainder of defense spending
is being diverted to Vietnam ...
Even so, it is still possible for loyal servants to disclaim this logical suppo-
sition and rationally refer our problems to the democratic processes of the
budgetary system itself by saying that:
. . . ours is a crisis basis of operation. We have to build up
usage rates and estimates for future budgets; therefore, immediate
needs must come by supplementals . . .
Such a smoke screen is recognizable. It does not seem consistent with the
language used in the House of Representatives Report of the first supplemental
appropriation for military functions, which states: "... the Committee
believes a position of plenty- -militarily- -is to be desired in the light of
3
world conditions. "
"A Budget That's Bound To Bend, " Business Week , January 29,
1966, p. 29.
2Rear Admiral E. E. Grimm, U.S. N. , Director of Budgeting and
Reports, Office of the Navy Comptroller. Presentation for the Navy Graduate
Financial Management Program at The George Washington University,
December 13, 1965.
3





Five years' experience with the DOD Programming System has made
the potential areas of strength clear to its users. More evident are the weak-
nesses, shortcomings, and associated problem areas. Representative exam-
ples have been selected from these problem areas as a means of providing
insight in this paper into the perplexing inconsistencies which still exist for
the military departments. This is done rather than to attempt to exhaust the
entire range of problems.
General Design Problems
The conceptual basis of the Programming System depends upon cen-
tralized decision making by proper authority. The continuing trend toward
this centralization has been accelerated by nearly every solution designed
to relieve the rapidly arising problems of war in Vietnam. "What has
evolved is a structure where there are too many people who can say No, but
not enough who can say Yes. " Even the smallest technical decisions have
been raised to the level of the OSD staff, creating far greater service work-
loads.
We do not challenge the process of functional review. . . . We do
challenge the amount of detail. This needs to be examined and brought
under control to avoid breaking the backs of the military department
staffs. The furnishers of data in the service staffs are the same peo-
ple contributing to the PCP and budget systems, although the OSD users
are different.
Q'Connell, op. cit.
2Comments by Mr. Schnurr, p. 8.
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Centralization has also caused the OSD to direct changes in procedures
prior to consulting the services, or before requested comments have been
reviewed and discussed with them. "Sometimes a more complete understand-
ing of the service view might be helpful. A more workable product should
result if the military services could participate in the development and staff-
ing of procedure changes. "
Another area of weakness is in the control of costing. The detailed
preciseness insisted upon has resulted in a completely inflexible device.
Hitch originally intended that cost estimates should be approximations.
Since preparing and digesting numerous cost estimates is itself
rather costly, however, it is uneconomic to insist on precise esti-
mates . . . the costs of programs and program increments would be
rough approximations. *
In reality, the detailed control over the five- /ear span has required an
3impossible degree of accuracy in cost figures, even in the remote years.
. . . the procedures for keeping the plan current have so much
built-in rigidity that it is difficult to make even factual changes which
do not involve true questions of program level. For example, under
current procedures, changes in cost factors cannot normally be made
more often than annually, except through the medium of the program
change proposal. . . . The tendency is now to ignore all except the
most necessary changes, and to change dollar amounts only when in-
accuracies have become large enough and obvious enough to warrant




Hitch and McKean, op. cit .
, p. 57.







Still other weaknesses lie in the fact that the timeliness of decisions
has not been aided. Even though PCP's must be submitted with massive
amounts of supporting data, lengthy reviews are required by OSD staff per-
sonnel with decisions often delayed weeks or months. The piecemeal opera-
tion of the PCP process makes it impossible for service managers to support
budgets as the optimum mix of programs.
Implementation or
Adjustment Problems
Perhaps the greatest weakness in the Programming System is that
budgeting is not yet in line with programming; there is no single "language"
2
linking the two together. Those working in budgeting functions still have
not completed the transition from appropriation accounts to program terms.
This is brought about by the fact that the terms most used are those most
useful to the functional manager or operational commander. This lack of
a common link is well confirmed by the following comment:
We are still doing business on our President's Budget and then
translating from these categories into program terms to talk to
McNamara.
This problem can compound itself when operating requirements require an
increase in some program element now being funded in part from the South-
east Asia supplementals. Should a need be determined for fifty additional
1 2
Ibid.
, p. 5. Admiral Grimm, op. cit .
3
O'Connell, op. cit .
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F-105 aircraft, this requirement must be translated from appropriation
account data to program terms in an attempt to obtain approval. Once author-
ized, program terms are then returned to the format of the appropriation
structure. In most cases of urgent need, this is neither practicable nor
f easible.
The FYFS&FP is used as an after-the-fact document. By nature it
does not lend itself to the short reaction times found in contingency oper-
ations. The FYFS&FP was developed on a model basis in a theoretical
environment. When opened to the real world, the controls it requires
become too burdensome. *
Historically, the FYFS&FP has never been used as a means of funding
during a period of extended military operations. The McKinsey corporation
is now under contract to the Department of Defense to conduct a management
study because:
The Five -Year Force Structure and Financial Program has become
so cumbersome it is unwieldy. Financed year by year it results in an
orderly process^butjwhen we get into a war it will fall apart. As a fact,
the September /JL965/ update of the Five -Year Force Structure has had
to be omitted and scheduled for some later date. There arises the ques-
tion of how can we make this system work ?.
Because major efforts are now being conducted with the specific intent of
determining solutions to these weaknesses of rapid reaction and workability,
further discussion in this problem area will be omitted. The McKinsey study
is expressly concerned with the mechanism by which changes are made in the
Interview with Captain P. L. Sullivan, U. S. N. , Associate Director
(Plans -Programming), Office of the Director of Budget and Reports, Office
of the Navy Comptroller, January 5, 1966.
2
Admiral Holmes, op. cit .

70
FYFS&FP. Anthony, as well, is directing a study on the management control
system. Many major changes will have been introduced in the Programming
System even before this paper is completed.
Other Problems
Many other problems have found their way into the arena of the pro-
gram budget as it relates to limited war. Whether transient or permanent,
they all leave some mark on the Programming System as they complicate and
confound the services. The inroads of interim solutions have seriously under-
mined both group and individual confidences in the system. As yet another
method of going ''around'' the problem is conceived, program budgeting loses
more of its strength to do the task it was intended to do. There is always
the tendency to take the safest approach; and this has often been found to be
the tried and proven one. As financial managers pare their programs, they
often wonder if the intended objective may still be obtained. After reprogram-
ming, only so much remains --when the least desirable have been taken out--
further reductions induce suffering in all other programs.
The individual soon loses his pride of effort and any sense of accom-
plishment diminishes when he can no longer compete with the system that is
robbing him of his program objective. Assets continue to be used up at a
rate faster than that at which they have been programmed. As an example,
the many hours of high-speed steaming during launch and recovery of contin-
uous air strikes in the South China Sea makes each and every operational
aircraft carrier old before its time; and replacement construction is not seen
•
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in the future. This feeling of a quickening of pace predominates. The entire
climate of operation encourages the optimization of short-run gains in fund
usage, to the detriment of long-run results. The pressures exerted for
more output from fewer funds over short periods may have unfavorable reper-
cussions in the long run. Conscientious managers frequently wonder if they
are not stinting on repairs, upkeep, or modernization. Have they crossed
the fine line that separates the extremity of excess and crossed over into a
vital requirement'' Or, if this does occur, have they still the authority to
make even that fact known ?
The basic fact today remains just as it was ten years ago. Managers
have come to the conclusion that 'militarily we must allow some over-
production and excess in money, because we never know what the require-
2
ments of war will be. " Remarks such as this again sound the cry of alarm
that was issued by the Rockefeller panel reports:
Achievement of the objectives of our national security programs
in the years ahead hinges on the availability of financial resources and
the manner in which they are applied. There is grave reason for con-
cern with respect to the inadequacy of recent levels of military appro-
priations, as well as with respect to the workings of the budgetary
process.
Regardless of the year, the major shortcomings seem to remain the
same. Military expenditures are kept low for political reasons. Budget
Horngren, op. cit .
, p. 294.
Sullivan, op. cit .
3
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Prospect for America, p. 149.
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ceilings result in a serious imbalance in overall military preparedness. The
programs of greatest importance to the security of the United States suffer
from insufficient funds. And the budget squeeze ultimately affects both our
short-term force level build-up and the rate at which our long-term research





In the course of this paper an attempt has been made to present the
Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program for inspection. Through
an understanding of daily operating procedures and the effects which these
have upon the many components of the FYFS&FP, it is possible to gradually
narrow the focus of attention to the items of greatest criticality. Utilizing
this method we would hope to see whether the Five-Year Force Structure
and Financial Program conceptually contains both adequate resources and
sufficient flexibility to deal with rapid changes in military force require-
ments. To accomplish this task it is necessary that we be able to ascertain
whether the FYFS&.FP can also be readily modified to accommodate the
requirements of a limited war. This provides a better understanding of the
degree of flexibility and the amount of resiliency inherent in the FYFS&FP.
Should less than the desired flexibility be discovered, our mission remains
unaccomplished unless a determination can be made whether the limit of






Our national resources are limited and exceedingly difficult to apply
effectively. Many alternative applications are to be found. Those resources
allocated to defense purposes must be applied to the optimum alternatives.
Consequently, the impetus in defense decision making is toward the scientific
approaches to management of the resources made available to the public
sector.
With today's requirements for a diversified military establishment,
it becomes economically infeasible to provide funding for the force structure
and weapon systems necessary to maintain a totally adequate defense posture.
The tendency is to rely on our strategic forces as a means of waging limited
war. This action reduces the effectiveness of our overall retaliatory capabil-
ity. In addition to maintaining a force in being, we must also possess a reso-
lution to use our force whenever required and, finally, we must ensure the
existence of necessary funding and a flexible budgetary system to carry out
our resolution. The Department of Defense Programming System establishes
the mechanisms by which budgetary decisions are made regarding the alterna-
tives in national defense. The Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Pro-
gram provides the continuing base for the Defense Deoartment's annual budget
submission.
Essentially the present Programming System is good in comparison
to the methods of the 1950's. Through mergers, consolidations, and cen-






Defense. Much of this increase in power has been wrested from the military
services in the interest of responsible, top-level decision making. Today,
Defense -wide programs are brought together to portray overall military
needs and readiness. It is now possible to analyze the total force structure
for all military services in terms of national objectives as well as financial
requirements over an extended period of years.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has proven that he can
make the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program serve its pur-
pose under a dollar ceiling limitation in conditions of semipeace. But when
this same ceiling is imposed during a situation of prolonged war with contin-
ually increasing exigencies, internal pressures develop which finally vent
themselves at the points of greatest strain- -in the military departments.
The services are forced to tighten up, to defer, to cancel, to reprogram, to
utilize emergency funding. It has become more and more evident that the
approval of a program does not automatically constitute the authority to
commit or obligate funds. Our current involvement in Vietnam has required
countless changes to previously approved programs for Fiscal 1966 alone.
This is the arena in which our real problems become evident. This, then,
is where we must look for the answers to the previously stated questions.
Answers to the Research Questions
The Five -Year Force Structure and Financial Program contains the
entire assets of the defense establishment. The resources made available
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are, by and large, adequate. Indications are that proper use has not been
made of many of the forces which constitute the FYFS&FP and this has im-
paired effectiveness. For example, Program V--Reserve and Guard Forces-'
is not being used to cope with the problems of limited war. Political and
economic pressures have rendered this portion of the FYFS&FP "unusable
or "untouchable. "' As a result, there is a drain on the deterrent capability
of our strike forces. Any combat attrition of this force limits the power of
our retaliatory sanction. Through our own unwillingness or inability to utilize
the full force structure of the FYFS&FP in the conceived manner, the enemy
has accomplished his purpose just as though he himself had imposed the crit-
ical constraint.
An additional weakness is seen in the lack of a more flexible repro-
gramming authorization from the Congress during periods of increased mili-
tary action. Funds appropriated for a peacetime mission no longer suffice.
Battle requirements have suddenly changed the entire scope and range of mili-
tary construction and weapon systems needed by our fighting men. Repro-
gramming presently is an ineffective procedure to rearrange funding to meet
unforeseen yet exigent necessities of combat operation.
The Five -Year Force Structure and Financial Program concept and
procedures can be modified if political pressures will allow. If they will not,
or if the powers exerting these political pressures refuse to recognize
increased military action as a signal for a contingency method of operation,
this manner of planning and structuring force requirements becomes as
'.
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ineffective as any other.
The controls which are built into the Programming System have caused
the Five -Year Force Structure and Financial Program to become too inflexi-
ble to be useful in dealing with significant unforeseen contingencies. The
Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program was designed to permit
peacetime planning efficiency and budgetary economy. Yet its overall flexi-
bility is deterred by the paperwork and coordination requirements necessary
to enable decisions which at present emanate principally from the top levels.
Much of this problem could be alleviated by setting thresholds at lower levels.
The thresholds now remain stationary regardless of rising prices, inflated
dollars, and infinitely sophisticated equipments with their ballooning costs.
Timely military decisions cannot be made within existing limits, and
yet these decisions are called for at all levels in times of war. The average
processing time of the PCP's is too lengthy as has been borne out by more
and more memorandum agreements. Memorandum agreements do not bring
formal changes to the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program.
Formal changes occur only at some later date when the procedural intricacies
of the PCP System allows. What these actions really attest to is the fact that
the detailed preparation now required for any PCP submittal is unnecessary.
The FYFS&FP is being choked by a proliferation of controls, when what is
most needed is a wholesale procedural streamlining.
These conclusions have been proven not once, but three times. On
each of these occasions a defense supplemental appropriation has been
.
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authorized to cover cost increases which could be met by no other means.
Many of these cost increases caused a drain on operating funds, resulting
in overprogramming in anticipation of additional appropriations. With each
supplemental appropriation the total costs of the FYFS&FP are pushed fur-
ther under an obscuring cover of secrecy, while the mechanisms of the Pro-
gramming System strain to overcome the restrictions forced ever more fre-
quently upon it.
The Five -Year Force Structure and Financial Program can become
an effective tool only if permitted to do so. In the last five years the myriad
of problems which were previously labeled "insurmountable" has gradually
reduced. Much work has been done to improve costing and estimating, the
last major stumbling block within the FYFS&FP. However, this work can-
not continue when political maneuvering forces these costs to be hidden or
disguised. Unless there is a recognition by all levels of our government that
the Vietnam conflict has emerged as a rapidly expanding limited war, and its
demands come to be laid out openly and aboveboard, the Five-Year Force
Structure and Financial Program will never become totally effective. Only
when the full impact of every financial transaction can be analyzed in its
proper place will the operators of the Programming System be able to recom-





The previously stated areas of weakness can be summarized, into two
major failures of the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program.
The total funding of the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Pro-
gram is essentially at peacetime costs. Element costs are originally entered
as such precise values (even for remote periods in time) that any cost varia-
tions which occur result in serious inflexibility. Thresholds are set for
extremely close tolerances. The processes of program change have become
too lengthy and too difficult. In fact, the problems of initiating a change have
reached such complexity that PCP's are avoided until inaccuracies become
too great to live with, or the error in dollar amounts is obvious enough to
warrant the work involved. Once a program is entered it is impossible to
alter the sum composition of the FYFS&FP unless an exactly offsetting
change may also be made. It is easy to observe why a war --even a limited
war as is currently being waged in Vietnam --exaggerates funding require-
ments. The defense budget originally established for Fiscal 1966 was $56. 6
billion. Including the increases concealed in this year's supplemental appro-
priations ($1. 7 and $12.8 billion), the total Fiscal Year 1966 defense budget
stands at $71.0 billion. These figures show the marked variance arising in
just one year from the programs originally held within the FYFS&FP as
rigidly controlled, precisely costed dollar amounts.
The Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program serves no use-
ful managerial purpose at the level of the individual military services. It
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does not enable decision making or provide any direction for their economic
management of funds. It exists solely as a tool for higher authority. This
condition, however, need not exist. The controls of the FYFS&FP could be
reoriented to enable service utilization. The final and undeniable fact appears
to remain that the Secretary of Defense does not wish to relinquish any of his
control to the services. The Programming System, of which the FYFS&FP
is the "heart, " was designed as a tool of decision making specifically for the
use of the Secretary of Defense. Even at the expense of Departmental effi-
ciency, here is where the decision-making authority apparently is to remain.
Other Remarks
It is not within the limited ability of the writer to offer specific recom-
mendations for the solution of these failings of the Five-Year Force Structure
and Financial Program. These are matters which must be resolved at
extremely high levels as national policy issues. As long as the FYFS&FP
serves the needs of the Secretary of Defense, its continuation on the present
basis seems justified. Should inefficiencies at the Departmental level impair
the ability of the Secretary to manage the defense establishment, these issues
would then become vital to national defense. As such, they would call for
resolution at the Presidential level, perhaps as an overt act by the National
Security Council, or covertly through suasion from the Bureau of the Budget.
The scope of this paper has been somewhat broader in nature than is
customary for a thesis. This was done with intent on the part of the writer
in the desire to accomplish two purposes. Initially, this paper provided the
.
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vehicle to conduct a study of the entire Department of Defense Programming
System. To this end the required research has been a tool for self-
instruction. Further, it is hoped that this study may serve as a platform
from which may rise further studies in this field. In this regard, any of the
specific areas of discussion in Chapter III would provide a timely and probing
thesis topic. Among these should be:
A study of the methods of securing force structure changes
A study of the effects of a budgetary ceiling
A study of reprogramming actions
A study of the deferral and cancellation of military projects
A study of the utilization of emergency funds
A study of the military supplemental appropriation processes.
An exceptionally timely study could be initiated regarding the impacts of the







General meaning in this paper
The selection of potential courses of action through
a systematic consideration of alternatives. This
tells us what we have t o do.
The specific determination of manpower, materiel,
and facilities necessary to accomplish a program of




The process of translating manpower and materiel
resource requirements into financial resources of a
specified time period. Then getting the money.
A combination of men, equipment, and installations
effectiveness is related to our national security
objectives. Elements exist within service boundaries.
Program Related groups of program elements considered
together for decision purposes because they support





The summary of all approved programs of the Depart'
ment of Defense. Its purpose is to arrive at the




1. The amount required to finance a program ele-
ment in a given year, regardless of when
Congress appropriated the funds.
2. A method of measuring costs --the total financial
requirements for the FYFS&FP, or any compo-
nent part.










An adjustment in the approved FYFS&FP submitted
whenever variances (increases or decreases) exceed
specified thresholds.
The methods and procedures to establish, maintain,
and revise the FYFS&FP.
A transfer of funds within appropriation categories
without asking for a change in amount. A shift.
1. For PCP's: A set of criteria which require a
program change to be submitted for approval by
the Secretary of Defense when they are reached.
2. For Reprogramming: A set of criteria below
which the Secretary of each military department
can reprogram in his own authority, but above
which a reprogramming request form (DD 1415)
must be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense
for action and transmittal to the Congress.
Approved Programs Components of the FYFS&rFP approved by the Secre
tary of Defense, modified by the approved PCP's,
reprogramming action, Subject/Issues, or below
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